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INTRODUCTION
The authors presented the articles in this volume in February 2020 at a
conference that was open to students, lawyers, and the general public. As we
write this Introduction several months later, we are keenly aware that such a
conference would not have been possible under our changed circumstances.1
An even greater change has occurred within the legal system. Most trials have
been delayed, and only the most urgent hearings happen in person.2 Courts
are wrestling with when, and how, they will reopen. Given this new legal

* Thanks to Lyz Riley for exceptional editing help. An earlier version of the ideas in this
introduction was presented at an ABA Criminal Justice workshop by Chad Flanders, and he
is grateful for the comments of Kate Weisburd, Andrew Ferguson, and Avlana Eisenberg on
that occasion.
1
In April, Governor J.B. Pritzker of Illinois extended Illinois’ “stay-at-home” order
through May 30. Read the Full Modified Stay-at-Home Order from Gov. Pritzker Now in
Question, NBC CHICAGO (Updated Apr. 30, 2020, 12:01 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/
news/local/read-the-full-modified-stay-at-home-order-from-gov-pritzker-now-inquestion/2262609/ [https://perma.cc/MEK6-3DU7].
2
See, e.g., Alanna Durkin Richer & Michael Tarm, Justice Delayed: COVID-19 Crisis
Upends Courts System Across US, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://
www.timesfreepress.com/news/breakingnews/story/2020/apr/09/justice-delayed-covid-19crisis/520208/ [https://perma.cc/LF3B-95UG].
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reality, the articles in this volume might seem, at first blush, not only as if
they were written in a prior time, but also as if they were written for a prior
time.
Yet the urgency of the questions addressed in this volume has been, if
anything, heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic. We have seen striking
changes in the attitudes of state officials to incarceration in a very short time.
Since the beginning of the pandemic, many more people have been released,
rather than detained, before trial.3 Low-level offenders are being sentenced
to home confinement.4 More police are giving warnings for low-level
offenses rather than making arrests,5 and prosecutors have established
policies against prosecuting those arrested for low-level offenses.6 As a
result, prison and jail populations are declining, although it is too soon to tell
how dramatic or permanent that decline will be.
These moves are driven by the fear—and, in many cases, the reality—
of COVID-19 outbreaks in jails and prisons.7 Correctional institutions are
now virus hot spots,8 and states and localities do not want to be responsible
for the human suffering or for the costs of caring for a rash of new patients.
At the same time, these reforms are in line with what so-called progressive
3

See Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Updated Sept. 11,
2020) https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html [https://perma.cc/G62T-FTE8].
4
See Jacqueline Policastro, Allison Maass & Tyler Smith, More Inmates Released to
House Arrest Because of COVID-19, but Some Officers Have Concerns, WABI (May 9, 2020,
7:22 AM), https://www.wabi.tv/content/news/more-inmates-released-to-house-arrest-beca
use-of-covid-19-but-some-officers-have-concerns-570334621.html [https://perma.cc/9JPMQP8S].
5
Police Responses to COVID-19, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (updated July 8, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/police-responses-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/UZM8-8E7U].
6
CHRIS W. SURPRENANT, COVID-19 AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 2 (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.mercatus.org/publications/covid-19-policy-brief-series/covid-19-and-pretrialdetention [https://perma.cc/66KS-5DJX].
7
See UCLA Law Covid-19 Behind Bars Data Project, UCLA LAW, https://law.ucla.edu
/centers/criminal-justice/criminal-justice-program/related-programs/covid-19-behind-barsdata-project/ [https://perma.cc/6EXT-UJPZ]; see also Alice Speri, Mass Incarceration Poses
a Uniquely American Risk in the Coronavirus Pandemic, INTERCEPT (May 6, 2020, 10:01
AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/05/06/coronavirus-prison-jail-mass-incarceration/ [https:
//perma.cc/277W-SYLY].
8
See Anna Flagg & Joseph Neff, Why Jails Are So Important in the Fight Against
Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (updated May 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31
/upshot/coronavirus-jails-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/55S8-JAN4] (“Both in large jails
located in virus hot spots like New York and Seattle and in smaller jails across the country,
the churn of people moving in and out threatens to accelerate the spread of the disease,
endangering the incarcerated, the staff and the larger community.”). Additionally, there is
probably serious undercounting of the number of prisoners who have contracted the virus.
Speri, supra note 7.
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prosecutors have proposed and fought to implement during the past several
years.9 In March 2020, many progressive prosecutors joined the chorus of
voices calling on the criminal justice system to protect the well-being of those
“behind prison walls.”10
Of course, the vision of a smaller and more humane criminal justice
system that motivates progressive prosecutors is not shared by all, even
during the pandemic. Still, significant reforms can be motivated by crisis.11
One might even argue that the progressive prosecution movement teed up
these reforms by changing the terms of the conversation, making mass
release not only thinkable, but also practically feasible. Progressive
prosecutors were showing how release could be done before it absolutely
needed to be done.
The spread of COVID-19 has slowed many other promising reforms,
however, including some pushed by progressive prosecutors. For example,
treatment courts are more difficult to run when there is little or no chance for
in-person hearings or meetings.12 Some prosecutors in overwhelmingly
Democratic jurisdictions, such as King County in Washington, have opposed
release efforts.13 Additionally, it is not obvious whether, or how long, some
9

See infra Part I.
Joint Statement from Elected Prosecutors on COVID-19 and Addressing the Rights and
Needs of Those in Custody, FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION 1 (Updated Mar. 25, 2020),
https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Coronavirus-Sign-OnLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRR5-HYT5] [hereinafter FJP Joint Statement]. These
prosecutors were explicit that the proposed reforms were not just good ideas in the middle of
a crisis, but good ideas, period. See id. at 4 (“Even after the urgent threat of the coronavirus
subsides, these sensible and smart policies should remain.”); see also Nora V. Demleitner,
State Prosecutors at the Center of Mass Imprisonment and Criminal Justice Reform, 32 FED.
SENT’G REP. 187, 190 (2020) (“Generally, highly cooperative jurisdictions in which
prosecutors have spearheaded release efforts seem to have made more progress in bringing
jail populations down quickly in response to COVID-19.”).
11
See Benjamin Levin, Criminal Law in Crisis, COLO. L. REV. F. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 2) (on file with authors) (“This exceptional situation and crisis mentality offer
an important opportunity to appreciate the hardships experienced by people affected by the
criminal system and potentially to save lives in the process.”).
12
Robert V. Wolf, In Practice: Drug Courts in the Time of COVID-19, CTR. FOR COURT
INNOVATION (Mar. 2020), https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/drug-courts-covid19
[https://perma.cc/6ED4-QJ36] (“Treatment courts rely on face-to-face interactions with
participants. They also typically require frequent in-person drug testing. And those who
receive medication, such as methadone, typically have to show up on a daily basis to receive
it.”).
13
See, e.g., Radley Balko, Opinion, Stopping COVID-19 Behind Bars was an Achievable
Moral Imperative. We Failed., WASH. POST (May 1, 2020, 4:18 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/01/stopping-covid-19-behind-bars-was-an-achievablemoral-imperative-we-failed/ [https://perma.cc/9XQ8-YYD8] (“In King County, Wash., an
10
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of the recent changes to the criminal justice system will last. It may be only
a matter of time before the ranks of prisons and jails swell back to the status
quo ante. Before the pandemic, there were already signs of backlash against
the progressive prosecution movement.14 It is unclear whether this backlash
will grow in the coming months and years.
This Introduction seeks to place the articles in this volume into the
context of a post-pandemic world. COVID-19 has accelerated the timetable
for many debates that might otherwise have percolated or simply stalled. The
viability of progressive prosecution is one such debate. Part I provides a
broad overview of progressive prosecution, focusing mainly on the promises
made by progressive prosecutors on the way to election and the early returns
on those promises. Part II sketches how, in the early days of the COVID-19
pandemic, some state and local officials worked to promote specific goals
associated with progressive prosecution, including releasing low-level
offenders from jails and reducing arrests. We also consider the extent to
which these moves, driven mostly by short-term expediency, are likely to
endure after the crisis has passed or receded. We conclude by articulating
some of the challenges progressive prosecutors will likely face in the future.
I. WHAT IS “PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION”?
The story of the rise of progressive prosecution has been told in many
places and in many ways, and it is retold by several of the articles in this
volume.15 The key idea behind progressive prosecution, however, bears some
articulation, as it will frame much of what will be discussed in these pages.
It is somewhat hoary, but not less true for being so, to say that prosecutors
should see that “justice be done.”16 The notion of justice implicit in this
early epicenter of the outbreak, public defenders filed motions to release low-level offenders,
the sick and elderly, and those nearing the ends of their sentences. One attorney told me that
while she and her colleagues attended release hearings in person, prosecutors voiced their
opposition over the phone to avoid exposure.”).
14
See TCR Staff, Prosecutors on the Firing Line: Backlash Against ‘Progressives’
Grows, CRIME REP. (June 24, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/06/24/prosecutors-onthe-firing-line-backlash-against-progressives-grows/ [https://perma.cc/C2FV-KMR3] (“Socalled ‘progressive’ prosecutors around the country are coming under renewed attack from
critics who say their policies are encouraging crime.”); see also infra notes 85–87 and
accompanying text.
15
See Jeffrey Bellin, Expanding the Reach of Progressive Prosecution, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 707 (2020).
16
See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
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dictum implicates the community as a whole—it is a justice for victims of
crime as well as for those accused of crimes. Prosecutors win when justice
prevails.17 Conversely, prosecutors do not win when someone is falsely
accused, wrongly convicted, or unjustly sentenced.
Somewhere along the line, the story continues, the notion of being on
the side of justice faded as an animating ideal of prosecution. “Good”
prosecution became defined in terms of success rates, and success was
defined in terms of convictions and length of sentences.18 Pursuing justice
became more about winning at trial or (more often) in plea bargaining.
Elected prosecutors campaigned on their experience processing cases rather
than their commitment to treat everyone fairly or promote alternatives to
incarceration.19 Rather than being informed by the needs of the community
and the treatment of the accused, justice became “harsh justice.”20 It was
against this vision of prosecution that Professor Abbe Smith memorably
argued that being a good prosecutor was incompatible with being a good
person.21 Maybe prosecutors had not by themselves created mass

done.”); A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTIONS Standard 3-1.2(b) (2017) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice
within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”).
17
See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 642 (1999) (“[P]rosecutors must not only battle lawbreakers, in furtherance of the
government’s objective of convicting the lawless. Additionally, prosecutors must resist
various forces that would undermine the government’s other aims.”).
18
See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Problems with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV.
CRIMINOLOGY 451, 458 (2018) (citation omitted) (“American prosecutors are often faulted for
excessive zeal in pursuing convictions and harsh sentences and for their frequently strident
opposition to criminal justice reforms that could lower sentences, curtail prosecutors’
discretion, or weaken their bargaining position when negotiating pleas and cooperation
agreements.”).
19
See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581,
591 (2009) (summarizing results of empirical study on prosecutor elections to find that
“candidates tend to focus on individual qualifications rather than the performance of the entire
office. When the campaign rhetoric does turn to office performance, the claims relate to
quantity of cases processed rather than the quality of results”).
20
William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
780, 781 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (“The constitutional proceduralism of the 1960s and after
helped to create the harsh justice of the 1970s and after.”).
21
Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 355, 396 (2001) (“My answer to the question, ‘Can You Be a Good Person and a Good
Prosecutor?’, is now probably evident. But, let me say it plainly. . . . My answer is both harsh
and tempered: I hope so, but I think not.”).
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incarceration—it took a village22—but they were certainly key drivers of the
phenomenon.23 Mass incarceration could not exist without mass prosecution.
Enter the progressive prosecutors.24 Progressive prosecutors focused on
the power and discretion of prosecutors, which could be wielded either for
harsh justice or for mercy and leniency.25 On the logic of the progressive
prosecution movement, lenient prosecutors could make cases go away faster
than aggressive defense attorneys.26 After all, it is far easier to dismiss a case
than to fight a rear-guard battle with suppression motions and objections,
only to settle on a plea deal. The prosecutor could do more than simply play
defense on an uneven playing field. She could resolve cases with the stroke
of a pen or even decide not to charge in the first place.
To be sure, the ideal of progressive prosecution still involves
prosecuting. Yet, here, too, progressive prosecutors have articulated different
priorities. They devote resources to resolving violent crimes rather than lowlevel drug, property, and “quality of life” offenses.27 Their office policies are
driven by data, not by perception. The defaults are no longer high bail
requests, long sentences, and charging the most serious offenses with the
hopes of getting a good plea deal. Perhaps not all defendants should go to
prison, even for a short time. For those sentenced to incarceration, shorter
22

Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 181 (2019).
See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 133 (2017) (describing prosecutors as “the most powerful actors
in the criminal justice system” and concluding that prosecutors “have used this power to drive
up prison populations even as crime has declined over the past twenty or so years”); but see
Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration,
116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018) (contending that the primary empirical bases of Pfaff’s
conclusion that prosecutorial decision making drives mass incarceration are either disputed by
other empiricists or are “artifact[s] of changes in . . . court reporting practices”).
24
For a good overview of the early stages of the movement, see Sam Reisman, The Rise
of the Progressive Prosecutor, LAW360 (Apr. 7, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1145615/the-rise-of-the-progressive-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/A5DQ-EV94].
25
See Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive Movement,
3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 1, 5 (2019) (“[J]ust as the power and discretion of prosecutors
have contributed to mass incarceration and racial disparities in the criminal justice system,
that same power and discretion may be used to institute reforms to correct these injustices.”).
26
See Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=34791
65 [https://perma.cc/9PKP-2QR7] (“Reform-minded prosecutors animated by a principle of
lenience would work to broadly ratchet down, not redistribute, the system’s severity.”).
27
See, e.g., Rachael Rollins, The Public Safety Myth, APPEAL (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://theappeal.org/the-public-safety-myth/ [https://perma.cc/6CHW-398R] (“I believe in
prioritizing the offenses that cause serious physical harm or death rather than misspending our
limited resources on low-level offenses. Murders, shootings, and sexual assaults should be our
highest priority; offenses like drug possession, loitering, and driving on a suspended license
should not.”).
23
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sentences might improve overall welfare. The right kind of prosecution
policies could lead to “less crime and less incarceration, to the benefit of
victims and offenders alike.”28
The promise of such reforms could be exaggerated, of course. In many
areas, the tactics of so-called progressive prosecution would not, in fact,
dramatically change the status quo. Murders, sexual assault, and other violent
crimes would still be prosecuted, perhaps even more aggressively. However,
progressive prosecutors premised their electoral appeals on confronting mass
incarceration rather than being a party to it. As such, many progressive
prosecutors ran on platforms that sometimes read like wish lists for criminal
defendants. These platforms might be seen as restoring the equilibrium of a
system that had become misaligned.
This shift of focus amounted to something of a sea change, and the
progressive prosecutors announced it as such. The typical prosecutor either
ran unopposed or based on their record of convicting offenders.29 Progressive
prosecutors could not run the same way since they lacked “tough on crime”
records and, in some cases, prosecutorial experience altogether (for example,
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner, one of the highest-profile
progressive prosecutors, was a former criminal defense lawyer).30 Instead,
progressive prosecutors ran on what they would do and, once in office,
provided detailed policy papers and platforms indicating the reforms they
enacted.31
The goals articulated by progressive prosecutors can be placed into
three broad categories: reducing the total incarcerated population, reforming
28
MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS
PUNISHMENT 5–6 (2009).
29
See Wright, supra note 19, at 593 (finding that 85% of prosecutorial elections in a
nationwide study involved a prosecutor running unopposed).
30
Jennifer Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasnerscampaign-to-end-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/MY76-DJC6] (“Until Larry Krasner
entered the race for District Attorney of Philadelphia last year, he had never prosecuted a case.
He began his career as a public defender, and spent three decades as a defense attorney.”).
31
See,
e.g.,
THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO
(Mar.
2019),
http://files.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/The-Rachael-Rollins-Policy-Memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DN3K-DKKY]; see also Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner’s Revolutionary
Memo, INTERCEPT (Mar. 20, 2018, 8:21 AM), https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03
/20/philadelphia-da-larry-krasners-revolutionary-memo/
[https://perma.cc/GLB6-GT3U];
Sam Clancy, Wesley Bell’s Office Announces Policy Changes Including Bond Reform,
Marijuana Prosecution, 5 ON YOUR SIDE KSDK NEWS (updated Jan. 2, 2019, 7:52 PM),
https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/politics/wesley-bells-office-announces-policy-changesincluding-bond-reform-marijuana-prosecution/63-288d0f14-d7ed-4688-bccc-d7c8430f32a3
[https://perma.cc/KY55-LQLA].
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the institutions of the criminal justice system, and changing the “tone” of
prosecution.32 These categories are not silos, of course, and certain reforms
fit in more than one category. Still, they provide a rough taxonomy of what
progressive prosecutors ran on and hoped to accomplish if they were elected
(as many were).33
Nearly every progressive prosecutor ran on ending mass incarceration.34
Interpreted one way, this is an almost impossible goal. Mass incarceration is
a complex phenomenon that has unfolded over a long period of time and
involved interactions among numerous different actors within the criminal
justice system. No prosecutor, no matter how large her jurisdiction, could
eliminate it unilaterally. The goal is more tractable if read more modestly as
a concern with diminishing the large-scale, long-term, racially disparate
system of incarceration in the United States. Progressive prosecutors
proposed three broad ways of accomplishing this goal. First, they would
focus on reducing pretrial incarceration, either by lowering bail amounts or
eliminating cash bail altogether.35 Second, and more controversially, they
would enact non-prosecution policies regarding certain categories of crimes,
32

See generally THE BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
PROSECUTOR, (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/21principles-21st-century-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/VDP3-3KCT].
33
For a good overview of the goals of progressive prosecutors, one could do worse than
this summary by David Garland:
[P]rosecutors have the power to steer the system toward a more equitable, temperate, and racially
conscious criminal justice. They can use diversion programs rather than jail, charge with restraint,
plea-bargain fairly, end cash bail, treat drug addiction as an illness and kids as kids, establish
conviction review, expunge criminal records, and utilize data and cost-benefit analysis to improve
decision-making.

David Garland, The Road to Ending Mass Incarceration Goes Through the DA’s Office, AM.
PROSPECT (Apr. 8, 2019), https://prospect.org/justice/road-ending-mass-incarceration-goesda-s-office/ [https://perma.cc/3VD7-AAGZ] (discussing the premise of EMILY BAZELON,
CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS
INCARCERATION (2019)).
34
The audacity of this part of the agenda was quickly picked up by major media outlets.
See, e.g., Gonnerman, supra note 30; see also Daniel A. Medina, The Progressive Prosecutors
Blazing a New Path for the U.S. Justice System, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2019, 2:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/23/us-justice-system-progressive-prosec
utors-mass-incarceration-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/W54E-YY3F] (“The protester was
now the prosecutor. And [Wesley] Bell had won on a radical platform promising to end mass
incarceration, dramatically reform the cash bail system, end the death penalty and
decriminalize marijuana possession in the county of just under a million people.”).
35
See, e.g., THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, supra note 31, at 14–15 (outlining
policies regarding cash bail); Read Wesley Bell’s New Policies, Issued Jan. 2, 2019, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/read-wesleybells-new-policies-issued-jan-2-2019/pdf_d4a5a66c-31b5-5c38-a5f7-f526ad0144cc.htm
[https://perma.cc/MZ8M-MWLM].
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such as low-level drug offenses and, in some jurisdictions, prostitution and
failure to pay child support.36 They might also charge some crimes—such as
shoplifting—as misdemeanors, rather than felonies—even under statutes
allowing for felony charges.37 Third, line prosecutors would be instructed not
to exercise full leverage in plea negotiations, systematically pushing for
shorter sentences and alternatives to incarceration for certain classes of
cases.38
The second category of reforms involved the creation or bolstering of a
set of new institutions. Two such institutions stand out. First, progressive
prosecutors sought to create conviction integrity units.39 Such units would be
less about reducing incarceration in the present (although they might have
that result on a case-by-case basis) and more about righting past wrongs—
for example, convictions where exculpatory evidence was withheld or cases
where an innocent person was found guilty. Second, progressive prosecutors
favored the increased use of specialty courts.40
Finally, a more amorphous goal of progressive prosecutors involved
changing the tone of what it means to be a prosecutor, manifesting and
talking about a more open, less punitive, more holistic approach to criminal
justice.41 Sometimes this goal had specific policy implications. For example,
36

E.g., ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH supra note 35, at 5–6 (articulating new child support
policies for Prosecuting Attorney’s office in St. Louis County, Missouri); see also
Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner’s Revolutionary Memo, supra note 31, at 1 (instructing
prosecutors to decline marijuana charges and certain prostitution charges).
37
E.g., RECLAIM CHI., THE PEOPLE’S LOBBY & CHI. APPLESEED FUND FOR JUSTICE,
SENTENCES OF INCARCERATION DECLINE SHARPLY, PUBLIC SAFETY IMPROVES DURING KIM
FOXX’S SECOND YEAR IN OFFICE 2 (July 2019) https://www.thepeopleslobbyusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/2019-07-Final-Report-Kim-Foxx-ForPrint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65M7-PRRX]; see also RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, supra note 31, at
app. c.
38
See, e.g., THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, supra note 31, at 37; Philadelphia DA
Larry Krasner’s Revolutionary Memo, supra note 31, at 2–5.
39
Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3542792
[https://perma.cc/L8TP-N3Q9] (“[A] number of ‘progressive prosecutors’ have instituted or
increased emphasis on conviction integrity units that are designed to double-check line
prosecutors’ work and ensure that the office isn’t securing wrongful convictions.”).
40
THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO, supra note 31, at 6, 35; Larry Krasner, Lecture
by Larry Krasner, 3 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 99, 118–19 (2019) (describing efforts in the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s office to provide services to defendants with mental
illnesses).
41
Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Career Motivations of State Prosecutors, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1667, 1709 (2018) (discussing policies championed by groups such as
Prosecutor Impact and the Institute for Innovation in Prosecution and how these “policy shifts
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some advocated for open file discovery policies regarding evidence or
specific protocols on charging criminal offenses.42 Other times, the goal
showed itself in support of broad public health measures as alternatives to
resolving public health problems by arresting the people subject to them.
Perhaps most idealistically, the goal involved projecting an image of care and
concern not only for victims, but also for criminal defendants who
themselves might in some sense be victims of social circumstances or
systemic racial injustice. If this broad goal was realized, then prosecutors
would be accountable not simply for the number of people they locked up or
for convictions they obtained in high-profile cases, but rather for their
contributions to making society fairer and more just. Prosecutors would win
if they treated everybody—suspects, defendants, victims, and concerned
community members—with dignity and respect.
II. PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION IN A PANDEMIC
When the extent of the COVID-19 pandemic became clear, many
reformers identified prisons and jails as possible sites of massive outbreaks.
The crowded conditions of these institutions make disease transmission more
likely, both within the institution and in the surrounding communities.43
Worse, prisons and jails are notoriously unsanitary places—some residents
do not have regular access to soap, let alone hand sanitizer.44 State and local
officials thus began to plan how to decrease the prison and jail population
quickly, and progressive prosecutors in many localities championed these
efforts.45 Pandemic-based decarceration was supported by critics of the
require prosecutors to embrace a more holistic, responsible conception of how law
enforcement resources ought to be used, and to consider the detrimental impact of prosecution
on traditionally disadvantaged groups”).
42
David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
ONLINE 25, 35 (2017) (advocating that prosecutors adopt “open file” policies).
43
Mark Osler, Opinion, We Must Thin the Prison Populations Before Pandemic Hits
Them, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Mar. 27, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.startribune.com/wemust-thin-the-prison-populations-before-pandemic-hits-them/569174562/
[https://perma.cc/TXY5-WD4Y] (“Jails and prisons are petri dishes for disease in normal
times. These are not normal times. . . . If the virus runs through a prison, too, it inevitably will
come back to surrounding communities through prison workers; what goes in will come back
out.”).
44
See Rachel Barkow, Our Leaders Have the Power to Release People in Prison. Now
They Must Use It., APPEAL (Mar. 27, 2020), https://theappeal.org/coronavirus-prisoncommutations/ [https://perma.cc/9QF7-MU4H] (“Most U.S. detention facilities force people
to bunk with one or two others, and some require them to sleep and eat in large communal
areas. Social distancing in these environments is impossible. Even basic hygiene is a luxury:
Many people in prison have no access to hand sanitizer and struggle to pay for soap.”).
45
See FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 2–3.
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progressive prosecution concept, including Attorney General William Barr.46
The result was a nationwide push along at least three lines.
The first major push was to reduce the population of pretrial detainees.47
In some offices, the default changed to releasing on recognizance those
charged with low level, non-violent offenses48 Likewise, those awaiting trial
were either to be given new bail hearings or else simply released on their own
recognizance if the prosecutor and judge determined that the detainee was
not a danger to the community. Implicit in these calculations were the general
restrictions of quarantine—if most people are sheltering in place and most
businesses are closed, then those released would present less danger to the
community than in normal conditions.
A second, less intense push involved releasing those sentenced to terms
in prison or jail.49 The focus here was on those imprisoned for low- level,
non-violent offenses, who could be let out without significantly increasing
the danger to the community. This goal could be accomplished by early
release (in jurisdictions that would allow it) or by changing the terms of
confinement—for example, through some form of house arrest or release to

46
See Memorandum from William Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All
Department Components and All United States Attorneys 2 (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.justi
ce.gov/file/1266901/download [https://perma.cc/8DBD-D8ZL] (“[Y]ou should now consider
the medical risks associated with individuals being remanded into federal custody during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Even with the extensive precautions we are currently taking, each time
a new person is added to a jail, it presents at least some risk to the personnel who operate that
facility and to the people incarcerated therein.”); Michael Balsamo, Barr Defends Police,
Takes Swipe at Progressive Prosecutors, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 12, 2019, 1:48 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/barr-defends-police-takes-swipe-at-progressiveprosecutors [https://perma.cc/G7M8-YGWR] (“Barr took a hard swing at prosecutors who
don’t embrace the same tough-on-crime stance. He said appointing such progressive district
attorneys is ‘demoralizing to law enforcement and dangerous to public safety’ because they
‘spend their time undercutting the police, letting criminals off the hook, and refusing to
enforce the law.’”); see also William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at
the Major County Sheriffs of America Winter Conference, (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarksmajor-county-sheriffs-america-winter [https://perma.cc/YSX4-SPBK].
47
See Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19, NW. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 11–12) (citing examples), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3576163 [https://perma.cc/86LL-E5G2].
48
See, e.g., Kira Lerner, California Makes Major Bail Change to Slow the Spread of
Coronavirus in Jails, APPEAL (Apr. 6, 2020), https://theappeal.org/california-bail-coronaviru
s-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/9ANX-ZXSM] (“The California Judicial Council on Monday
issued a statewide emergency order setting bail at $0 for most misdemeanor and lower-level
felony offenses. The sweeping measure is the state’s latest effort to empty its jails to curb the
spread of the novel coronavirus.”).
49
See FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 3.
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a third-party custodian.50 Executive branch officials could also simply
commute offenders’ sentences.51 Judges might release inmates who were
already close to the end of their sentences.52 Early efforts along these lines
emphasized removing especially vulnerable populations from the prison
system—for instance, inmates who were immunocompromised, sick, or
elderly.53 The implicit logic was that leaving vulnerable populations in prison
would be tantamount to sentencing them to death.
A third, related push involved changes in enforcement policies.54 Police
and prosecutors articulated clear policies that only the most serious offenses
would be subject to imprisonment.55 Lower-level offenses could be dealt with
by warnings or, at worst, summons to appear in court at later dates. Given
the changed conditions, arrests for low-level or nonviolent offenses,
accompanied by even brief stays in jail awaiting resolution, constituted a
public health risk.
In these three ways, the COVID-19 pandemic gave additional
momentum to measures progressive prosecutors were endorsing and
endeavoring to advance already. The movement to end cash bail, already
popular among progressive prosecutors prior to the pandemic,56 was
effectively put into place overnight in many places and for many offenses.57

50

See Carroll, supra note 47, at 11.
See Jonathan Capehart, Opinion, Trump and Governors Can Slow the Spread of
COVID-19 in Prisons and Jails, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2020, 9:25 AM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/01/trump-governors-can-slow-spread-covid-19-prisonsjails/ [https://perma.cc/UA4H-2EJC]; Joe Sonka, Gov. Beshear Commutes Sentences of
Additional 352 State Inmates in Response to COVID-19, COURIER J. (Apr. 28, 2020, 4:55 PM),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/28/beshear-commutes-sent
ences-352-kentucky-inmates-response-covid-19/3038367001/ [https://perma.cc/E4X5-5J49];
Press Release, Washington State Governor’s Office, Inslee Issues New Orders to Reduce
Prison Populations During the COVID-19 Outbreak (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.
governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-issues-new-orders-reduce-prison-populations-duringcovid-19-outbreak [https://perma.cc/GSH9-CXAH].
52
See Douglas A. Berman, Another Robust Week for COVID-Influenced Federal Sentence
Reductions Using § 3582(c)(1)(A), SENT’G L. & POL’Y (May 8, 2020), https://senten
cing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2020/05/another-robust-week-for-covidinfluenced-federal-sentence-reductions-using-3582c1a.html [https://perma.cc/VB65-QRSJ].
53
See FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 3.
54
See FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 2–3.
55
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. supra note 5; FJP Joint Statement, supra note 10, at 2.
56
See Aurélie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The
Influence of Prosecutors, 8–9 (June 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138 [https://perma.cc/NEE7-EZQ7].
57
See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 48.48
51
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Prosecutions for drug crimes were deprioritized.58 Prisons and jails released
scores of inmates, and alternatives to incarceration were adopted.59 People
were put on some form of supervised release or home arrest.60 Many were
simply let go. Of course, these changes were not universal, nor were they
uniformly adopted. In some jurisdictions, it was business as usual.61 In
jurisdictions where progressive prosecution never obtained a foothold or was
rejected, reforms were hard to come by and, in some instances, actively
resisted.62 Indeed, in some places the pandemic was used to justify more
punitive measures—for example, that people should stay in jail precisely

58

See Chip Mitchell, During the COVID-19 Pandemic, Low-Level Drug Cases Won’t Be
Prosecuted in Cook County, NPR (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2020
/03/23/820148938/during-the-c-o-v-i-d-19-pandemic-low-level-drug-cases-won-t-beprosecuted-in-cook-county [https://perma.cc/8GZD-3293]; Tim Prudente & Phillip Jackson,
Baltimore State’s Attorney Mosby to Stop Prosecuting Drug Possession, Prostitution, Other
Crimes Amid Coronavirus, BALT. SUN (Mar. 18, 2020, 8:33 PM), https://www.baltimore
sun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-ci-cr-mosby-prisoner-release-20200318-u7knneb6o5gqvnqmtpe
jftavia-story.html [https://perma.cc/MEA3-5VL2].
59
Matt Hamilton, James Queally, & Alene Tchekmedyian, California’s Prisons and Jails
Have Emptied Thousands into a World Changed by Coronavirus, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2020,
5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-17/coronavirus-prison-jailreleases [https://perma.cc/W8P2-S7BE]; Emily Hoerner, Hundreds of Illinois Prisoners
Released as COVID-19 Spreads, but Few Elderly See Reprieve, INJUSTICE WATCH (May 6,
2020), https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/prisons-and-jails/2020/hundreds-of-illinois-pris
oners-released-as-covid-19-spreads-but-few-elderly-see-reprieve/ [https://perma.cc/7CHJWKYE]; Catherine Kim, Why People Are Being Released from Jails and Prisons During the
Pandemic, VOX (Apr. 3, 2020, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/3/21200832/jailprison-early-release-coronavirus-covid-19-incarcerated
[https://perma.cc/ASU2-7LBH];
Maggie Vespa, Days After Gov. Brown Calls for Release of 100 Inmates, Lawmakers Call for
2,000, KGW 8 (June 15, 2020, 9:11 PM), https://www.kgw.com/article/news/health
/coronavirus/oregon-coronavirus-prisons-inmates-early-release/283-615460a6-5451-4772a3e1-3fd769c8a839 [https://perma.cc/GPJ4-DGUH].
60
Policastro, Maass & Smith, supra note 4.
61
The federal prison system has been especially slow to release inmates. See, e.g., Joseph
Neff & Keri Blakinger, Few Federal Prisoners Released Under COVID-19 Emergency
Policies, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 25, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshall
project.org/2020/04/25/few-federal-prisoners-released-under-covid-19-emergency-policies
[https://perma.cc/NTZ6-YNF7].
62
For example, in May 2020 one district attorney in Oklahoma argued that Oklahoma’s
Pardon and Parole Board lacked the authority to recommend the commutation of certain kinds
of sentences and that its consideration of commutation applications “has got to stop. They
have gone way too far, and public safety and the verdicts and sentences of judges and juries
are being attacked on a monthly basis . . . .” Press Release, Payne Cty. Dist. Att’y, (May 4,
2020), https://www.1600kush.com/news/payne-county-da-press-release-5-4-2020 [https://per
ma.cc/K7CS-VZGD]; see also infra notes 77–78, 80.
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because they needed to be contained.63 On this logic, the general public
needed protection from incarcerated people not only because they were
dangerous, but also because they might be sick. If decarceration policies
cannot gain traction in such jurisdictions despite the public health rationale
provided by a historic emergency, will they ever?
Moreover, the salience of public-health-focused efforts at decarceration
could complicate many ongoing policies that are at the core of the
progressive prosecution agenda. Consider treatment courts.64 Intake
procedures for new clients have been postponed until the pandemic breaks or
suitable online procedures are developed.65 If treatment staff cannot show up
to court or have regular meetings with clients, then treatment programs
generally—and their clients in particular—might suffer.66 Likewise, many
treatment courts require in-person employment as part of their curriculum.67
If discussions about relaxing in-person work restrictions escalate and become
more politicized, then treatment courts may be faced with new quandaries—

63

In response to a lawsuit by the ACLU of Connecticut seeking the release of incarcerated
people in order to slow the spread of COVID-19, the defense argued that releasing “large
numbers of inmates” would be “unreasonably dangerous to the community and the public,”
since “the social support networks in the communities in the cities and towns to which these
offenders would be released [have] been dramatically impacted by the COVID-19 public
health emergency” and “a dramatic increase in releases would make [the reintegration] process
not only much more difficult, but also would inevitably increase the health risk to the public
by releasing individuals prematurely, without adequate risk assessments, health reviews,
referrals and transition plans . . . .” Defendants’ Objection to Motion for Temporary Order of
Mandamus at 3–4, Conn. Criminal Def. Lawyers Ass’n v. Lamont, No. HHD-CV20-6126477S, 2020 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 504, (Apr. 7, 2020), (No. HHD-CV20-6126477-S),
http://civilinquiry.jud.ct.gov/DocumentInquiry/DocumentInquiry
.aspx?DocumentNo=18978030 [https://perma.cc/9DEN-9GN8].
64
For a sensitive discussion of one treatment court’s adjustment to the pandemic, see, e.g.,
Jonathan Gallardo, Adult Treatment Courts Adjust to Life in Quarantine, GILLETTE NEWS REC.
(May 16, 2020),
https://www.gillettenewsrecord.com/news/local/article_ede1c2d0-9c2e-5698-bb9e-d8969
03e84ed.html [https://perma.cc/E549-PEL5].
65
See Rob Abruzzese, Court System Expands Virtual Operations and Opens Up ProblemSolving Courts, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE (May 7, 2020), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/20
20/05/07/court-system-expands-virtual-operations-and-opens-up-problem-solving-courts/
[https://perma.cc/7ZJL-EPE8].
66
See Wolf, supra note 12.
67
See Lisa M. Shannon, Afton Jackson, Elizabeth Perkins, & Connie Neal, Examining
Gender Differences in Substance Use, Participant Characteristics, and Treatment Outcomes
Among Individuals in Drug Court, 53 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 455, 470 (2014) (“In most
[drug courts], there is an employment requirement associated with drug court participation;
the lack of ability to comply with this requirement typically results in programmatic sanctions
unless there is a specific medical reason why the participant is unable to work and/or if the
individual is enrolled in a school/educational program.”).
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for example, if clients are forced to choose between risking their health and
risking their freedom. Further, the newly-mediated forms of social
interaction can dramatically complicate even the simple act of drug testing,
a foundational element of most treatment courts.68 In short, the viability of
existing treatment court models has already been challenged during the
pandemic, and the efficacy of many such programs will likely depend on the
wise exercise of discretion by program officials.
Conviction and sentencing review units can at least proceed in one
respect: past cases can still be reviewed. Yet efforts to rectify such cases still
require in-person contact to conduct investigations and to hold hearings.
Review of past cases will be delayed because everything is being delayed,
and priority may go to moving current cases, not in relitigating past ones.69
Court systems are shutting down70 and will reopen only gradually. Moreover,
if conviction integrity units are not fully staffed to begin with, then they are
unlikely to command greater resources given the state and local budget

68
See Regina LaBelle & Shelly Weizman, Drug Courts and COVID-19, O’NEILL INST.
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/drug-courts-and-covid-19/ [https://perma.
cc/Q8BS-MK37]; Henry Sotelo, Opinion, Due Process: Specialty Courts and COVID-19,
THISISRENO (Apr. 28, 2020), https://thisisreno.com/2020/04/due-process-specialty-courtsand-covid-19-opinion/ [https://perma.cc/G6LE-P55N].
69
In Missouri, the pandemic has not prevented the state from vigorously arguing against
one prosecutor’s efforts to re-open a case. See Jordan Smith, Missouri’s Attorney General Is
Fighting for the Right to Keep an Innocent Man in Prison, INTERCEPT (May 4, 2020, 7:00
AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/05/04/missouri-attorney-general-lamar-johnson-prison/
[https://perma.cc/GW8F-MFAU]; see also Jessica Miller, Utah’s Attorney General Is
Fighting Salt Lake County Over Efforts to Review Cases Where Convicts Say They Are
Innocent, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2020/02/24/utahsattorney-general-is/ [https://perma.cc/J5A7-3SJC].
70
See Sarah Stillman, Will the Coronavirus Make Us Rethink Mass Incarceration?, NEW
YORKER (May 25, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/05/25/will-the-corona
virus-make-us-rethink-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/5BHH-92Z5] (“Even after mass
releases began, [grassroots organizer Raj] Jayadev feared that many defendants were being
‘left off the rescue boat,’ particularly those charged with felonies. ‘Just because someone has
been accused of a crime with a higher bail schedule doesn’t mean they deserve a potential
death sentence,’ he said. With court systems shutting down because of the pandemic, it was
harder to advocate for defendants. ‘I don’t even have access to my clients right now—that
whole system is out the window,’ [public defender Carson] White told me, in March.”).
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constraints that will likely exist post-pandemic.71 Time matters in light of the
pandemic. Many defense attorneys are racing against the clock.72
How will the pandemic ultimately affect the progressive prosecution
movement? There are several possible ways that public health arguments for
decarceration could interact with the extant justifications championed by
progressive prosecutors. An optimistic story is that the relationship will be
additive—that the original arguments against mass incarceration will be
supplemented by a health-based rationale, and the progressive reform
movement will gain a new urgency.73 In other words, those who are not
persuaded that reducing prison populations is a moral requirement and
consistent with public safety might nonetheless accede to decarceration
policies out of concern for public health. Moreover, progressive prosecutors
will obtain powerful new evidence for their case if the increased release of
persons from incarceration does not produce significant increases in crime.
A self-reinforcing cycle might be created: release does not lead to a rise in
crime or increased risks to public safety, which helps support the case for
further release.74
A less optimistic, but still hopeful, prediction is that COVID-19 creates
a modus vivendi on decarceration policies, rather than a robust and lasting
consensus. The problem here is that once the pandemic wanes or becomes
manageable, support for decarceration policies might follow suit. There will
be change, but that change will be short-lived. In this scenario, people will
be more than willing to default to the pre-pandemic status quo. It is thus
worth considering that the movement for reform may become too tied to the
public health rationale for decarceration to be seen as an end worth achieving
71

See, e.g., Caroline Beck & Mary Sell, DAs Look to Legislature for Funding Help After
COVID-19, TIMESDAILY (May 4, 2020), https://www.timesdaily.com/news/das-look-tolegislature-for-funding-help-after-covid-19/article_5fef3f49-5f0c-5dd9-a1e1-dd2d2797e99
5.html [https://perma.cc/29XE-UCUT].
72
Barbara Bradley Hagerty, Innocent Prisoners Are Going to Die of the Coronavirus,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/americas-inn
ocent-prisoners-are-going-die-there/609133/ [https://perma.cc/ZRS3-3HJP] (“Across the
country, innocence lawyers are filing emergency petitions to get their clients released from
prison before the virus can kill them.”).
73
This is not unlike what Derrick Bell considered under the broad heading of “interest
convergence.” Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
74
See Alexi Jones, Stagnant Populations and Changing Demographics: What the New
BJS Reports Tell Us About Correctional Populations, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 5, 2020),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/05/05/bjs-reports/ [https://perma.cc/M58S-5LXE]
(“It remains to be seen whether jail populations will bounce back up after the pandemic
subsides, or whether decarceration will become the ‘new normal’—or at least a more
politically acceptable strategy in places that have been reluctant to reduce jail populations.”).
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for other reasons. For example, suppose prisons and jails become cleaner,
more hygienic, and less densely populated as a result of reforms. This status
would be consistent with the public health rationale for decarceration, but it
would not address the concern—explicit in many progressive prosecution
agendas—that decreasing the population of jails and making them sanitary
and hygienic places to house people is not just a matter of preventing another
outbreak; it is a matter of treating prisoners humanely.75 As soon as the public
health crisis passes or public attention is diverted, prisons and the people
inside them may again be neglected, and the warehousing of people might
resume. The policies of progressive prosecutors may take place without
taking hold. There will have been a pause, but not a stop, to mass
incarceration.
Indeed, the most pessimistic prediction might be that the public health
case for decarceration displaces the arguments that progressive prosecutors
have built: emergencies are the only time to decarcerate.76 Perhaps even more
cynically, one can imagine that those who oppose the broader progressive
prosecution agenda will use this crisis to frustrate decarceration by expanding
the list of behaviors subject to criminal penalties or by insisting that keeping
people in prison is necessary to prevent further spreading of the virus.77 One
might even worry about the counter-narrative: that it is not fair that those who
75

See, e.g., VERA INST. OF JUST., WE MUST URGENTLY DO MORE TO ADDRESS COVID-19
BEHIND BARS AND AVOID MASS INFECTION AND DEATH: GUIDANCE FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL
BARR, GOVERNORS, SHERIFFS, AND CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATORS (updated May 12, 2020),
(emphasis omitted) https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/coronavirus-guidance-crisi
s-behind-bars.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ4G-LRHF] (“Enact emergency policies, practices, and
conditions to maintain the dignity and health of incarcerated people consistent with COVID19 best practices for social distancing and protective measures against infection and spread.”).
76
See Levin, supra note 11, at 11 (“[S]uggesting that a particular crisis or set of crisis
conditions are exceptional risks legitimat[es] the non-crisis conditions and accepting the
desirability of the old normal.”).
77
See Nicholas Chrastil, As Calls for Release of Inmates Increase, DA’s Office Argues
Against Bond Reductions, Saying Defendants Could Spread Virus if Freed, LENS (Mar. 18,
2020), https://thelensnola.org/2020/03/18/as-calls-for-release-of-inmates-increase-das-office
-argues-against-bond-reductions-saying-defendants-could-spread-virus-if-freed/
[https://perma.cc/RJ2X-ED7Z] (quoting members of the Orleans Parish DA’s office: “If the
defendant is released on bond during the Coronavirus outbreak and goes into public places, it
will pose a threat to the general public by potentially spreading the virus to others and
increasing the rate at which others are exposed to the virus”); see also Chad Flanders, Courtney
Federico, Eric Harmon & Lucas Klein, “Terroristic Threats” and COVID-19: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3575700 [https://perma.cc/D7HS-JQ6P]; Derek Maiolo, Policing in a Pandemic:
Citations, Arrests Raise Concern over COVID-19 Public Health Orders, STEAMBOAT PILOT
& TODAY (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.steamboatpilot.com/news/policing-in-a-pandemiccitations-arrests-raise-concern-over-covid-19-public-health-orders/ [https://perma.cc/DS4MC454].
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have committed crimes get to go free, while everyone else must shelter in
place.78 More worrisome still is the push in some places to combat the spread
of COVID-19 in prisons by going on lockdown,79 effectively placing all
inmates in solitary confinement regardless of their conduct.80 Here, the public
health rationale works in a decidedly counter-progressive direction by being
used to further harsh treatment of the incarcerated.81 This prediction, if
realized, would see the public health self-interest rationale displacing the
progressive prosecution agenda. Of course, some places will resist any
attempt to trade off public safety with public health on the idea that criminals
belong in jail and progressives should not “exploit” the pandemic to achieve
reforms.82 In such jurisdictions, the thinking goes, the pandemic is no reason
to deviate from harsh justice.
78

See, e.g., John Shindlebower, Group Protests Shut Down of State for Virus, PIONEER
NEWS (Updated May 6, 2020, 4:01 AM), https://www.pioneernews.net/content/group-protest
s-shut-down-state-virus [https://perma.cc/D7CZ-YHAB] (quoting a protestor as saying,
“We’ve allowed a police state to be created, complete with a snitch line for neighbors to rat
out other neighbors, all the while we have a governor taking down license plates of
churchgoers, while at the same time, letting prisoners go free”); Sean Kennedy, Maryland
Should Not Release Prisoners. It’s Safer for Everyone, WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2020, 11:30
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/27/maryland-should-not-releaseprisoners-its-safer-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/QM7B-PWNY], (“In Gov. Larry Hogan’s
Maryland, honest citizens are confined to their homes on the pain of prison while prisoners go
free. It seems we live in an upside-down world.”).
79
Keri Blakinger, What Happens When More than 300,000 Prisoners Are Locked Down?,
THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 15, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/202
0/04/15/what-happens-when-more-than-300-000-prisoners-are-locked-down
[https://perma.cc/5BA7-TZUQ].
80
See Tony Messenger, Messenger: Outbreak of COVID-19 Infects Juveniles, Staff at St.
Louis County Detention Facility, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/columns/tony-messenger/messenger-outbreak-ofcovid-19-infects-juveniles-staff-at-st-louis-county-detention-facility/article_291c8498-6d6c5fef-aa01-3d83483a5477.html [https://perma.cc/724C-S2TX]; Joseph Shapiro, As COVID-19
Spreads in Prisons, Lockdowns Spark Fear of More Solitary Confinement, NPR (June 15,
2020, 4:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/15/877457603/as-covid-spreads-in-u-s-prisons
-lockdowns-spark-fear-of-more-solitary-confinemen [https://perma.cc/96T9-RXLY].
81
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 47, at 15–16 (noting that some policy reactions to COVID19 implicitly adopt the logic that “detaining all persons indefinitely will effectively insulate
the remaining population from any risk of infection as a result of any period of detention,”
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CONCLUSION
Prior to the pandemic, the progress of progressive prosecution was
mixed. Many policies that could be changed by fiat were enacted and
effectuated immediate results.83 In some jurisdictions, the number of
incarcerated people declined without a major uptick in crime, although the
significance of these declines is an open question.84 In some places, however,
progressive prosecution was at best a distant dream.85 Yet, even the early
efforts of progressive prosecutors have come under new scrutiny, especially
at the federal level. The system, as some put it, was “fighting back” against
reform efforts.86 Attorney General William Barr publicly excoriated the
policies of some progressive prosecutors.87 Moreover, some attorneys
general and state legislatures have taken steps to limit the power of specific
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See, e.g., Matt Daniels, The Kim Foxx Effect: How Prosecutions Have Changed in Cook
County, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 24, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshall
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[https://perma.cc/7GP8-V4DC] (emphasis omitted) (“We found that since she took office she
turned away more than 5,000 cases that would have been pursued by previous State’s Attorney
Anita Alvarez, mostly by declining to prosecute low-level shoplifting and drug offenses and
by diverting more cases to alternative treatment programs.”).
84
See, e.g., Del Quentin Wilber, Once Tough-on-Crime Prosecutors Now Push
Progressive Reforms, L.A. TIMES (updated Aug. 5, 2019, 9:29 AM), https://www.latimes.com
/politics/story/2019-08-02/once-tough-on-crime-prosecutors-now-push-progressive-reforms
[https://perma.cc/8KRV-LCFT] (“[U.S. Attorney William] McSwain pointed to police
statistics that showed homicides up 8% and shootings up 7% during Krasner’s first 18 months
in office. Krasner’s supporters point to statistics that show overall violent crime is down 7%
during that same period.”).
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prosecutors.88 And press attention has been paid to offenders, the supposed
beneficiaries of progressive prosecution or policies, who have committed
additional crimes.89 This reoffending, however anomalous, is used by critics
to condemn all decarceration policies.90 Some critics on the left have argued
that the changes enacted by progressive prosecutors have not only failed to
effect real change, they may also have impeded efforts towards a more
revolutionary transformation of the criminal justice system.91
It is also difficult to tell how COVID-19 might change the trajectory of
progressive prosecution. When courts reopen, all prosecutors will face a glut
of trials and grand juries to complete. In the short term, this may lead to much
better deals for defendants as prosecutors work to clear their dockets because
they cannot handle the multiple trials for which public defenders may now
call. But this may only happen for a time. A return to normalcy, whenever it
happens, will reinstate the inherently unequal power dynamics of this system.
In places where prosecutors have been forced by public health crises to
implement decarceration tactics, the restoration of business as usual seems
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likely and may even be welcomed.92 Moreover, if there is a rise in violent
crime, even progressive prosecutors may well turn out to look more like old,
tough-on-crime prosecutors.93
These risks of retrenchment point to an additional, possibly inherent,
problem with the progressive prosecution movement—namely, that its
success depends on the implementation of specific reforms in specific offices
and not just at the prosecutorial level. Absent significant legislative or
executive changes, the scope and longevity of these decarceration efforts will
be limited.94 A district attorney can refuse to charge minor drug possession,
but only a legislature can repeal the law that makes drug possession illegal.95
In general, because mass incarceration is a systemic phenomenon, it is
unclear whether decarceration policies that do not address systemic issues
can succeed in the long term. Even one-time mass commutations will not fix
the structural, systemic nature of mass incarceration. It took a village to
create mass incarceration. It will take an array of reforms at all levels to get
rid of it.
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It is difficult, in general, to determine whether progressive prosecution
has effected, or will bring about, lasting and beneficial change to the criminal
justice system.96 A lot of the goals of progressive prosecutors are long-term
and cannot be measured by what happens this year or next. We are also still
working out the proper metrics for measuring success.97 This analytic
difficulty is compounded by the phenomenon of COVID-19. In the near
future, specific policies championed by progressive prosecutors, such as
expansion of treatment courts and conviction integrity units, may take a
backseat to more urgent, docket-clearing concerns. Increases in crime rates
could lead to public backlash against prosecutors who favored mass release.
Any decarceration brought about by the crisis may be short-lived. In fact, it
may only last as long as the pandemic.
Still, some arguments point in the other direction. COVID-19 has
provided a new rationale for many of the same reforms championed by
progressive prosecutors. The crisis has created an opportunity for the creation
of a virtuous cycle wherein early release of prisoners (or release on
recognizance of defendants) does not create much in the way of additional
crime. This, in turn, provides momentum for even greater decarceration.
Prisons and jails may become less crowded and more humane. Moreover, the
medicalization of criminal justice policies—treating crowded jails as a public
health concern—may increase support for treating crime more generally as a
public health problem. Given the unlikely triumph of progressive prosecutors
in winning elections and instituting reforms during the past half-decade, hope
for the movement’s further success might be rational. Although the COVID19 pandemic has been an unspeakable tragedy and a public policy disaster, it
may yet provide the impetus for further reform.
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